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A Novel Approach for Bidding on Keywords in Newly 
Set-up Search Advertising Campaigns 
Abstract 
Purpose: Advertisers setting up search engine advertising campaigns for the first time 
need to place bids on keywords, but typically lack experience and data to determine ranks 
that maximize a keyword’s profit (generally referred to as a cold-start problem). This 
article aims at solving the problem of bidding on keywords in newly set-up search engine 
advertising campaigns. 
Approach: We suggest that advertisers collect data from the Google Keyword Planner to 
obtain precise estimates of the percentage increases in prices per click and clickthrough 
rates, which are needed to calculate optimal bids (exact approach). Together with the profit 
contribution per conversion and the conversion rate, the advertiser might then set bids that 
maximize profit. In case advertisers cannot afford to collect the required data, we suggest 
two proxy approaches and evaluate their performance using the exact approach as a 
benchmark. 
Findings: The empirical study shows that both proxy approaches perform reasonably 
well―the easier approach to implement (proxy 2) sometimes performs even better than the 
more sophisticated one (proxy 1). As a consequence, advertisers might just use this very 
simple proxy when bidding on keywords in newly set-up SEA campaigns. 
Originality/value: This research extends the stream of literature on how to determine 
optimal bids, which so far focuses on campaigns that are already running and where the 
required data to calculate bids is already available. This research offers a novel approach of 
determining bids when advertisers lack the aforementioned information. 
 
Keywords: Electronic Commerce, Online Marketing, Search Engine Advertising, 
Campaign Set-Up, Bidding Decision, Cold-Start Problem  
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Introduction 
Search engine advertising (SEA) has grown into a multibillion-dollar business that attracts 
about $1 of every $2 spent on online advertising (IAB 2014). The mechanism supporting 
SEA works as follows (Abou Nabout et al. 2012; Yao and Mela 2008): A consumer types a 
keyword, such as “cruise vacation,” into a search engine (e.g., Google, Bing) and receives 
two types of results. The lower, left-hand portion of the page shows unsponsored search 
results, whose ranking reflects the relevance assigned to these different results by a search 
algorithm. On the top and right-hand side, sponsored search results appear. Whereas the 
display of unsponsored search results is free of charge, advertisers pay for each click on 
their ads that appear among the sponsored search results. 
The rankings and prices paid per click depend on keyword auctions, which are 
generalized, second-price, sealed-bid auctions (Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz 2007; 
Varian 2007). In the auctions, advertisers submit bids for a specific keyword by stating 
their maximum willingness to pay for each click. The search engine provider then weighs 
the submitted bids according to the ad’s quality, which it measures using a proprietary 
quality score (QS), and displays the sponsored search results in decreasing order of 
weighted bids (Abou Nabout and Skiera 2012; Jerath et al. 2011; Katona and Sarvary 
2010). If a consumer clicks on an ad, the advertiser pays the search engine provider an 
amount equal to the next highest weighted bid divided by its own QS. The consumer who 
clicked on the ad gets redirected to the advertiser’s website to place an order or request a 
sales quote—both cases of potential conversions. 
Previous research has devised solutions for optimal bidding in SEA in those cases 
where the advertiser is able to obtain estimates of the following metrics (Abou Nabout et 
al. 2014; Abou Nabout et al. 2012; Skiera and Abou Nabout 2013)1: 
• profit contribution per keyword (i.e., the revenue per keyword times the profit 
margin); 
• conversion rate per keyword (i.e., how many of those who click on an ad 
finally convert into a customer); 
• percentage increase in prices per click (i.e., how strongly prices per click 
increase within better ranks); 
• percentage increase in clickthrough rates (i.e., how strongly clickthrough rates 
(= number of clicks / number of searches) increase within better ranks). 
                                                            
1 We acknowledge that the bidding decision model was already presented in two dissertations at Goethe 
University Frankfurt, namely Stepanchuk (2010) and Gerstmeier (2011). 
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The intuition behind the optimal bid presented in Abou Nabout et al. (2012), Skiera 
and Abou Nabout (2013), and Abou Nabout et al. (2014) is as follows: The higher the 
average profit contribution per keyword, the higher the amount that the advertiser will be 
able to spend on the acquisition of new customers. A higher average conversion rate per 
keyword indicates a more successful SEA campaign, allowing the advertiser to increase 
the bids. However, high percentage increases in prices per click mean that prices diminish 
substantially within ranks, which makes better ranks less attractive. As a consequence, the 
advertiser should place lower bids for keywords with high percentage increases in prices 
per click. Finally, if the percentage increase in clickthrough rates is high, then the number 
of clicks diminishes substantially within ranks, which makes better ranks more attractive. 
As a result, higher bids should be placed for keywords with high percentage increases in 
clickthrough rates.  
Let’s consider the following numerical example to illustrate the percentage 
increases in prices per click and clickthrough rates (see Table 1).  
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
In the numerical example in Table 1, only five ranks are displayed. Rank 5 costs the 
advertiser 1.00€. With a percentage increase in prices per click of 20%, rank 4 costs 1.20€, 
rank 3 costs 1.44€, rank 2 costs 1.73€, and rank 1 costs 2.07€. The percentage increase in 
clickthrough rates is 40% in the numerical example, with a clickthrough rate at rank 5 of 
1.00%. As shown in Table 1, the clickthrough rate then increases to 1.96% for rank 3 and 
to 3.84% for rank 1. Given a profit contribution of 100€ and a conversion rate of 1%, the 
optimal bid according to Abou Nabout et al. (2012), Skiera and Abou Nabout (2013), and 
Abou Nabout et al. (2014) is:  
 * 100 0.01 ln(0.40 1) 2.58€
ln(0.20 1) ln(0.40 1)
Bid ⋅ ⋅ += =
+ + +
 (1) 
However, advertisers setting up SEA campaigns for the first time typically lack 
data and consequently good estimates of the above metrics (Abhishek and Hosanagar 
2013)―often referred to as the cold-start problem (Kim and Srivastava 2007). Thus, it is 
almost impossible to predict which rank maximizes the keyword’s profit after acquisition 
costs. The aim of this article therefore is to solve the problem of bidding on keywords in 
newly set-up SEA campaigns. 
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The approach presented in this article thereby overcomes two common problems in 
SEA: limited variation in bids and endogeneity of bids (Abhishek and Hosanagar 2013). In 
typical SEA campaigns, advertisers change their bids infrequently, such that it might be 
difficult to identify the percentage increases from advertisers’ individual keyword data. In 
addition, potential endogeneity of bids might be a problem because bids for a particular 
keyword might be correlated with random shocks (e.g., a sunny weekend). The use of 
Google’s Keyword Planner (Goldfarb and Tucker 2011) overcomes both problems as it is 
independent of individual advertiser behavior. Collecting this data, however, is costly and 
time-consuming. Thus, we additionally suggest two proxy approaches that support 
advertisers in making good bidding decisions even when they cannot afford to collect the 
required data. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: After a review of previous 
research and an outline of the article’s contribution, we present a novel approach for 
bidding on newly set-up SEA campaigns (exact approach). Next, we present two proxy 
approaches that provide advertisers with guidance in case they cannot afford to implement 
the exact approach. We benchmark the two proxy approaches against the exact approach 
and conclude with a summary of the results and managerial implications. 
Previous Research and Contribution 
Recent work in SEA focuses on the question of how to determine optimal bids (Abou 
Nabout et al. 2014; Abou Nabout et al. 2012; Selçuk and Özlük 2013; Skiera and Abou 
Nabout 2013; Yang and Ghose 2010; Yao and Mela 2011). Selçuk and Özlük (2013) 
develop a model that minimizes costs for a certain number of impressions and clicks. 
Skiera and Abou Nabout (2013), on the other hand, implement a model already presented 
in Abou Nabout et al. (2012). Here, bids aim at maximizing a keyword’s profit after 
acquisition costs and Skiera and Abou Nabout (2013) establish the superiority of such bids 
by comparing profits from optimal bidding to profits from some unknown bidding 
behavior by the advertiser using a large-scale field experiment. Abou Nabout et al. (2012) 
use this bidding decision model to analyze the performance of fee-based compensation 
plans in SEA and recommend compensation plans that rely on the idea of sharing profit. 
For keywords in newly set-up SEA campaigns, however, advertisers lack the 
information needed to calculate optimal bids according to Abou Nabout et al. (2012), 
Skiera and Abou Nabout (2013), and Abou Nabout et al. (2014). We thus suggest that 
advertisers collect data from the Google Keyword Planner to obtain rather precise 
estimates of the percentage increases in prices per click and clickthrough rates, which are 
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needed to calculate these optimal bids (see Figure 1). We call this approach the exact 
approach of calculating bids. Together with the profit contribution per conversion and the 
conversion rate, the advertiser might then set bids that maximize profit. The exact 
approach additionally overcomes two common problems in SEA, limited variation in bids 
and endogeneity of bids (Abhishek and Hosanagar 2013), because it does not use 
individual advertiser data. 
However, collecting the Keyword Planner data is costly and time-consuming. In 
case advertisers cannot afford to collect the required data, we suggest two proxy 
approaches (see Figure 1) and evaluate their performance in a simulation study: 
1. Proxy 1 is based on percentage increases calculated per keyword type. 
2. Proxy 2 assumes that the ratio of the percentage increases equals 50%.  
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
Description of Exact Approach 
The Google Keyword Planner (https://adwords.google.com/KeywordPlanner)2 provides 
traffic and cost estimates for new keywords before advertisers add them to their campaign. 
When advertisers enter a keyword into the Keyword Planner, they obtain estimates for the 
keyword’s search volume, the expected price per click (depending on the provided 
maximum bid)3, the expected daily SEA costs alongside the expected average rank, and 
the number of resulting clicks.4 
Step 1: Data Collection 
In order to calculate the percentage increases in prices per click and clickthrough rates, 
advertisers will need to collect information about the prices per click and clickthrough 
rates for different ranks using the Google Keyword Planner (Goldfarb and Tucker 2011). 
This data is specifically suited for estimating percentage increases in prices per 
click and clickthrough rates because it overcomes two common problems that would result 
from the use of historical advertiser data (when campaigns are already running and not 
newly set-up): limited variation in bids and endogeneity of bids (Abhishek and Hosanagar 
                                                            
2 The service was previously called traffic estimator and the data in this article was collected during the time 
the service was known as such. The same data might today be collected using the Keyword Planner.   
3 The prices per click are typically displayed in the advertiser’s currency provided when first creating their 
Google AdWords account.  
4 For details about these metrics see: https://support.google.com/adwords/answer/3022575?hl=en. 
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2013). In typical SEA campaigns, advertisers change their bids infrequently, such that it 
becomes difficult to identify the percentage increases from advertisers’ individual keyword 
data. In addition, potential endogeneity of bids might be a problem. Imagine, for instance, 
an advertiser who increases the bid for a keyword in response to a random increase in 
demand, e.g., on a sunny weekend. It is very likely that the bids for a particular keyword 
are correlated with these random shocks, resulting in potential endogeneity. The use of 
Google’s Keyword Planner (Goldfarb and Tucker 2011) overcomes both problems as it is 
independent of individual advertiser behavior.  
Now, imagine a UK-based advertiser who wants to know how strongly prices per 
click and clickthrough rates increase within better ranks for the keyword “cruise vacation.” 
The advertiser goes to https://adwords.google.com/KeywordPlanner, types in “cruise 
vacation” and provides a maximum bid of 5€. Figure 2 shows the output that the advertiser 
is provided with by Google. With a maximum bid of 5€, the advertiser will need to pay 
2.17€ (Avg. CPC in Figure 2) and is assigned rank 1.83 (Avg. Pos. in Figure 2) in the 
sponsored search results.5 The clickthrough rate is estimated to be 1.4% (CTR in Figure 2) 
for rank 1.83, which will result in about seven clicks per day (daily number of searches 
equals 510). The advertiser will learn about the prices per click and clickthrough rates at 
different ranks while repeating this task for different maximum bids (e.g., 4€, 3€, 2€, etc.). 
 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
Unfortunately, SEA campaigns often contain thousands of keywords (Abou Nabout 
et al. 2014). These might differ substantially in their prices per click for rank 1. As a 
consequence, starting with a maximum bid of 5€ and decreasing it gradually by 1€ might 
be suitable for some keywords, which may lead to enough variation to learn about prices 
per click and clickthrough rates for different ranks. For very expensive or inexpensive 
keywords, however, this approach will not generate enough variation in ranks to estimate 
percentage increases in prices per click and clickthrough rates. Evaluating each keyword 
manually would be extremely cumbersome and time-consuming. 
In order to automate the task of retrieving information for different ranks, 
advertisers might use the developer service for the Google Keyword Planner 
                                                            
5 Google only provides advertisers with information about the daily average rank (e.g., rank is 2.8) so that the 
advertiser will not know exactly whether their advertisement will be displayed at the top of the screen or at 
the right-hand side. 
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(https://developers.google.com/adwords/api/docs/reference/v201302/TrafficEstimatorServi
ce)6. In order to ensure that enough variation in ranks is obtained, we suggest proceeding 
as follows: 
• Step i: submit maximum bid (here 5€ was selected)7; 
• Step ii: check whether submitted bid results in rank better than rank 2; 
• Step iii:  
– No: increase maximum bid by 1€ and continue with Step ii; 
– Yes: continue with Step iv; 
• Step iv: decrease bid gradually by 0.10€ until a bid of 0.10€ is reached. 
Based on the collected data, the advertiser might then calculate the corresponding 
percentage increases in prices per click and clickthrough rates.  
Step 2: Calculation of Percentage Increases 
According to Skiera and Abou Nabout (2013), these percentage increase in prices per click 
might be estimated as follows: 
 ln( )k k k k kBid Rankα β ε= + ⋅ + , (2) 
where Bidk denotes the bid of keyword k and Rankk is the rank of keyword k. The 
multiplier reflecting the increase in prices per click for keyword k, kδ , then equals 
1 exp( )kβ  and the percentage increase in prices per click is 1kδ − .  
Similarly, the advertiser might estimate the percentage increase in clickthrough 
rates using:  
 ln( )k k k k kCTR Rankγ φ υ= + ⋅ + , (3) 
where CTRk corresponds to the clickthrough rate of keyword k. The multiplier reflecting 
the increase in clickthrough rates for keyword k, kξ , then equals 1 exp( )kφ  and the 
percentage increase in clickthrough rates is 1kξ − . 
Please note that both multipliers reflecting the increase in prices per click and CTR 
are typically larger than 1. For example, a percentage increase 1kξ −  of 50% indicates a 
                                                            
6 According to previous conventions, this service is still called the traffic estimator service.  
7 Research shows that prices per click differ substantially with respect to keyword type (Ghose and Yang 
2009). Generic keywords are typically very competitive and more expensive than branded or retailer 
keywords. The advertiser might thus categorize keywords according to their keyword type (usually 
performed when creating ad groups anyway). Next, the advertiser might manually obtain the prices per click 
at rank 1 for three representatives of each category through the Keyword Planner tool. The average price per 
click should give the advertiser a good indication of which maximum bid to select in step i for each of the 
three categories.  
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multiplier of 150%, used to calculate the optimal bid. The same is true for the percentage 
increase 1kδ − .  
Step 3: Determination of Optimal Bid 
The optimal bid according to Abou Nabout et al. (2012), Skiera and Abou Nabout (2013), 
and Abou Nabout et al. (2014) maximizes the profit after acquisition costs kπ  for a 
specific keyword k: 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )Maximize ,
k
k k k k k k kBid
Bid PC g Bid S Bidπ = − ⋅  (4) 
 subject to 10 .k kBid Bid≤ ≤  (5) 
The advertiser’s profit is the difference between the profit contribution per 
conversion, PCk, and the acquisition costs per conversion, gk, multiplied by the number of 
conversions, Sk. The closed-form solution for the optimal bid *kBid  then is:  
 
* 1
*
1 * 1
, if ,
, if ,
k k k
k k
k kk
k k k
PC CR Bid Bid
Bid
Bid Bid Bid
ξ
δ ξ
′⋅ ⋅ < ′ ′+= 
 ≥
 (6) 
where PCk denotes the average profit contribution per conversion, CRk corresponds to the 
average conversion rate per conversion, and 'kδ and
'
kξ  are logarithms of the multipliers in 
prices per click, δk, and clickthrough rates, ξk, such that 'kδ = ln(δk), and 
'
kξ = ln(ξk). In case 
the optimal bid, *kBid , is higher than the bid required for rank 1,
1
kBid , the optimal bid is set 
to the bid at rank 1. 
Using the Google Keyword Planner data, the advertiser will thus be able to 
calculate the percentage increases in prices per click and clickthrough rates. In order to 
estimate the optimal bid, the advertiser will additionally need to retrieve estimates for the 
profit contribution per conversion, which might be the average profit contribution earned 
from a single purchase or a customer lifetime value. For the average conversion rate per 
keyword, the advertiser might rely on the conversion rate for other online activities (e.g., 
affiliate marketing) or assume that the average conversion rate is 1%.8 
                                                            
8This suggested conversion rate of 1% is based on a Google Analytics Benchmarking Newsletter from July 
2nd, 2011 and applies to many Western European countries as well as the U.S. 
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Drawback of Exact Approach 
While the exact approach allows the advertiser to calculate optimal bids for each single 
keyword in the campaign, a major drawback of the approach is that the advertiser will 
either need to collect keyword information manually, which is very time-consuming and 
cumbersome, or invest in the development of software that allows the advertiser to connect 
with Google’s developer service. Thus, an important question is how advertisers who are 
not able to afford one of the two solutions can still make good decisions when bidding on 
newly set-up SEA campaigns. 
Description of Proxy Approaches 
Aim 
The aim of the two proxy approaches is to obtain reliable estimates for the percentage 
increases in prices per click and clickthrough rates for different types of keywords such 
that advertisers who cannot afford to collect the required data can still make good bidding 
decisions. 
Proxy 1 
The first proxy is based on an analysis of the percentage increases of 321 keywords that 
differ in keyword type, number of characters, number of words, degree of competition9, 
industry, etc. The aim of the analysis is to establish logarithms of “typical” multipliers 
reflecting the increase in prices per click and clickthrough rates for different types of 
keywords, typeξ ′  and typeδ ′ :  
 
1
1 1
, if ,
, if , 
k k type Proxy1
k kProxy1
type typek
Proxy1
k k k
PC CR
Bid Bid
Bid
Bid Bid Bid
ξ
δ ξ
′⋅ ⋅
< ′ ′+= 
 ≥
 (7) 
In the past, researchers have come up with different categorizations of keywords. In 
this article, we compare two different categorizations, the first of which is the one by 
Ghose and Yang (2009) and the second is the one by Broder (2002). While Ghose and 
Yang (2009) categorize keywords into being branded, generic or retailer keywords, Broder 
(2002) thinks of keywords as either being transactional, navigational or informational. We 
                                                            
9 Google denotes the degree of competition as the number of advertisers that showed on each keyword 
relative to all keywords across Google. For more details, please see: 
https://support.google.com/adwords/answer/3022575?hl=en.   
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compare both categorizations in order to find the one that is more suitable for predicting 
logarithms of “typical” multipliers. 
Derivation of Proxy 1 
The data contain keyword information on prices per click and clickthrough rates at 
different ranks in the sponsored search results at one point in time for 321 keywords from 
nine different industries (airlines, automotive, banking, direct banking, drugstores, energy, 
insurance, telecommunications, and travel). The keywords included in the data were 
selected from a German price index published by explido Web Marketing.10 They either 
belong to an industry’s most important sponsored search keywords (according to their 
number of searches), its Top 20 websites in the organic search results, or they indicate the 
brand names of the industry’s market leaders. Figure 3 shows a histogram of the keywords 
in each industry. 
 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
 
Following Ghose and Yang (2009), the above keywords can be categorized into 
three keyword types: generic keywords (e.g., cruise vacation), retailer keywords (e.g., 
Travelocity), and branded keywords (e.g., Royal Caribbean). As shown by Ghose and 
Yang (2009), these keyword types typically exhibit significant differences in prices per 
click and clickthrough rates. As a consequence, differences are likely to occur in the 
percentage increases in prices per click and clickthrough rates across keyword types.  
Broder (2002) categorizes keywords as being either navigational, transactional or 
informational. Navigational searches aim at finding one particular website, which requires 
the searcher to already be aware of the website and its existence. Navigational searches, 
thus, have only one “right” result. Transactional searches, on the other hand, aim at 
performing some web-mediated activity such as shopping online or downloading music or 
software. A transactional search is very specific and frequently contains keywords such as 
“book,” “buy,” and “download.” Finally, informational searches aim at acquiring 
information that is assumed to be present on the Internet. Informational searches might be 
very broad and unspecific.  
The information about prices per click and clickthrough rates at different ranks was 
collected from the Google Keyword Planner (Goldfarb and Tucker 2011), which provides 
                                                            
10 For details see: http://www.explido.de/news/downloads/.  
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potential advertisers with estimates of the prices per click that they would expect to pay for 
different keywords. The Keyword Planner allows advertisers to state their maximum 
willingness to pay for a click by entering a corresponding bid for a specific keyword. It 
then returns the expected number of global and local searches for a keyword, its expected 
competition index, the expected rank resulting from the provided bid, the corresponding 
expected price per click and the expected number of clicks, and finally, the expected SEA 
costs.11 
To automate the task of repeatedly entering 0.10€ lower bids to attain as many 
different ranks as possible, a software was developed that connects to the Google 
developer service and collects the corresponding Keyword Planner data for bids that range 
from 5€ to 0.10€ (see description of approach in Section “Step 1: Data Collection”). 
Table 2 provides summary statistics of the final data set. We start with the summary 
statistics according to the categorization by Ghose and Yang (2009): There are 213 generic 
keywords in the dataset, 85 branded and 23 retailer keywords. The average number of 
global searches is highest for branded keywords (8,681,148). On average, retailer 
keywords receive the lowest number of global (1,127,515) and local (194,844) searches (in 
Germany), which also confirms the results from the explido price index. 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
The degree of competition, scaled between 0 (low competition) and 1 (high 
competition), is highest for generic keywords (0.79), which confirms industry reports of 
high competition for generic keywords (CyberWyre 2011; Kim 2011). Consequently, they 
garner the highest prices per click (1.66€ for top ranks) in this study. As expected and in 
line with previous research (Ganchev et al. 2007; Ghose and Yang 2009; Skiera and Abou 
Nabout 2013), prices per click at rank 1 to 3 (i.e., top ranks) are generally higher than 
prices per click at rank 4 to 6 for all three keyword types. 
The average number of clicks decreases within worse ranks due to primacy effects 
and is highest for generic keywords (670.00 clicks for top ranks). Therefore, SEA costs are 
far higher for generic keywords (9,427.37€ for ranks 1 to 3, and 1,030.18€ for ranks 4 to 6) 
than for other keywords and lowest for retailer keywords (1,493.84€ for ranks 1 to 3, and 
4.31€ for ranks 4 to 6), which receive very few clicks (304.00 clicks for top ranks) at rather 
low prices per click (1.19€ for top ranks). 
                                                            
11 Google denotes SEA costs as the average amount that the advertiser might spend per day for this keyword. 
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Finally, the percentage increases in prices per click range between 43% for generic 
keywords and 175% for branded keywords. The percentage increases in clickthrough rates 
are lowest for generic keywords (52%) and highest for branded keywords (129%). 
When using the categorization by Broder (2002), we recorded 106 keywords with 
informational intent, 122 keywords with transactional intent and 93 keywords with 
navigational intent. While the number of global searches is highest for navigational 
keywords (7,054,256), the number of local searches is highest for informational keywords 
(1,099,118), which reflects that navigational searches often include URLs that are relevant 
worldwide and not only in Germany (often English keywords). 
The degree of competition is highest for keywords with transactional intent (0.86) 
as they are often located at the very end of the purchase funnel. The degree of competition 
is lowest for navigational keywords (0.34), which suggests that advertisers rarely bid on 
URLs of competitor brands.  
Prices per click are highest for informational and transactional keywords (1.70€ and 
1.57€ for top ranks, respectively). The number of clicks for top ranks is surprisingly low 
for navigational keywords (298.79 clicks) compared to informational (1,085.96 clicks) and 
navigational keywords (358.74 clicks). The high number of clicks combined with high 
prices per click then results in very high SEA costs for top ranks for informational 
keywords (18,467.61€). But given that the user obviously knows the destination URL 
already when using navigational keywords, SEA costs are still pretty high for these 
keywords (2,695.22€). 
Finally, due to their specific nature, percentage increases in prices per click and 
clickthrough rates are very high for navigational keywords—183% and 130%, 
respectively. As a consequence, prices per click and clickthrough rates decrease 
dramatically within worse ranks. Percentage increases in prices per click and clickthrough 
rates are fairly low for informational and transactional keywords, which suggests that 
prices per click and clickthrough rates remain fairly stable across ranks (40% and 54% for 
informational keywords and 52% and 50% for transactional keywords).  
13 
 
Results for Proxy 1 
To predict the size of the multipliers, δk  and ξk, for different types of keywords (calculated 
according to Section “Step 2: Calculation of Percentage Increases”), we estimate the 
following four regressions using ordinary least squares12: 
Categorization according to Ghose and Yang (2009): 
 
( )
8
1 1 1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1 1
ln
,
k i ki k k k
i
k k k k k
a b Ind c Branded d Retailer f Comp
g WordCount h CharCount i Searches j German e
δ
=
= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +
∑  (8) 
 
( )
8
2 2 2 2 2
1
2 2 2 2 2
ln
,
k i ki k k k
i
k k k k k
a b Ind c Branded d Retailer f Comp
g WordCount h CharCount i Searches j German e
ξ
=
= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +
∑  (9) 
Categorization according to Broder 2002: 
 
( )
8
3 3 3 3 3
1
3 3 3 3 3
ln
,
k i ki k k k
i
k k k k k
a b Ind c Informational d Transactional f Comp
g WordCount h CharCount i Searches j German e
δ
=
= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +
∑  (10) 
 
( )
8
4 4 4 4 4
1
4 4 4 4 4
ln
,
k i ki k k k
i
k k k k k
a b Ind c Informational d Transactional f Comp
g WordCount h CharCount i Searches j German e
ξ
=
= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +
∑  (11) 
 
where: 
ln(δk): logarithm of the multiplier reflecting the increase in prices per click for 
keyword k, 
ln(ξk): logarithm of the multiplier reflecting the increase in clickthrough rates 
for keyword k, 
Indi: dummy variable indicating industry i, 
Branded: dummy variable indicating branded (vs. generic) keywords, 
Retailer: dummy variable indicating retailer (vs. generic) keywords, 
Informational: dummy variable indicating informational (vs. navigational) keywords, 
Transactional: dummy variable indicating transactional (vs. navigational) keywords, 
Comp: degree of competition, 
WordCount: number of words in a keyword, 
CharCount: number of characters in a keyword, 
                                                            
12 Please note that SUR estimation will be equivalent to OLS as the independent variables are identical across 
equations. 
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Searches: number of searches for a keyword, 
 
Please note that we decided to run a regression on the logarithms of the multipliers 
that reflect the increase in prices per click and clickthrough rates, δk  and ξk, instead of the 
percentage increases directly, in order to make the dependent variable more suitable to the 
assumption of linear regression. Table 3 shows their determinants, which enable 
advertisers to calculate the logarithms of “typical” multipliers for different types of 
keywords. Both categorizations share the fact that the keyword type (whether branded/ 
retailer or informational/transactional) has a significant impact on the size of the multiplier 
reflecting the increase in prices per click. For instance, the multiplier reflecting the 
increase in prices per click for branded keywords is, on average, 0.36 percentage points 
higher than the one for generic keywords. For informational keywords, the multiplier 
reflecting the increase in prices per click is, on average, 0.43 percentage points lower than 
the one for navigational keywords. 
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
Interestingly, multipliers reflecting the increase in prices per click do not differ 
across industries, which is also a stable result across categorizations. But the degree of 
competition (-0.60 percentage points) has a significant impact on the size of the multiplier 
reflecting the increase in prices per click. Finally, the fact that a keyword is German 
significantly increases the size of the aforementioned multiplier (0.06 to 0.07 percentage 
points higher for German keywords).  
The main difference between both categorizations is that the regression that uses 
the categorization by Ghose and Yang (2009) explains 62% of the variance in the 
multiplier reflecting the increase in prices per click, while the one by Broder (2002) 
explains 64% of it.  
Regarding the multiplier reflecting the increase in clickthrough rates, we find that 
generic keywords are no different from branded or retailer keywords. However, multipliers 
reflecting the increase in clickthrough rates are somewhat lower for informational 
compared to navigational keywords (-0.12 percentage points); navigational keywords do 
not differ from transactional keywords. 
In contrast to the multipliers reflecting the increase in prices per click, multipliers 
reflecting the increase in clickthrough rates differ across industries: They are lower in the 
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airline (-0.12 to -0.16 percentage points), online banking (-0.12 to -0.15 percentage points), 
and travel industry (-0.10 to -0.12 percentage points) compared to the insurance industry. 
In addition, the degree of competition (i.e., how many ads are shown) has a large and 
significant impact on the multiplier reflecting the increase in clickthrough rates (-0.62 to -
0.64 percentage points) following both categorizations. The number of searches also has a 
significant, but very small effect on the multiplier reflecting the increase in clickthrough 
rates, but only according to the categorization by Broder (2002). 
Again, the main difference between both categorizations is that the regression that 
uses the categorization by Ghose and Yang (2009) explains 57% of the variance in 
multipliers reflecting the increase in clickthrough rates and the one by Broder (2002) 
explains 59% of it. 
In order to make sure that no multicollinearity problem is present, we report the 
correlations between all variables in Appendix A. As expected, the two categorizations 
(Ghose and Yang 2009 and Broder 2002) are rather highly correlated (between -0.91 and 
0.68), but not identical. In addition, the VIF values for all variables are below 4.10, which 
suggests that we do not have a multicollinearity problem. Finally, we include a plot of the 
residuals in Appendix B as an additional indicator that the residuals seem to be well 
behaved. 
Drawback of Proxy 1 
Even though proxy 1 allows the advertiser to treat keywords differently, the major 
drawback of proxy 1 is that the coefficients for predicting the multipliers (Table 3) might 
change over time. In addition, we only looked at 321 keywords from nine industries, so it 
remains unclear whether these coefficients really generalize to other settings (particularly, 
for the multipliers reflecting the increase in clickthrough rates). 
Proxy 2 
Because of the above drawbacks, we suggest using proxy 2, which supports advertisers in 
submitting good bids even when they do not want to calculate percentage increases for 
specific keywords (exact approach) or keyword types (proxy 1).  
Derivation of Proxy 2 
Skiera and Abou Nabout (2013) suggest a heuristic that is based on the assumption that the 
percentage increases in prices per click and clickthrough rates are often very closely 
aligned. If this assumption holds true, then a good guess for the optimal bid is 50% times 
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the profit contribution per conversion times the average conversion rate per keyword. The 
authors justify the 50% heuristic by looking at the data of four different advertisers (mobile 
phones, fashion, industrial goods, and travel) and the average percentage increase in prices 
per click and clickthrough rates. They find that these average percentage increases are 
indeed very close together. 
In contrast to their analysis, we use percentage increases that are calculated based 
on macro-level data from the Google Keyword Planner. The advantage of this data is that it 
overcomes the two common problems in SEA, which individual advertiser data might 
suffer from: limited variation in bids and endogeneity of bids. In addition, we extend their 
analysis to more industries (airlines, automotive, banking, direct banking, drugstores, 
energy, insurance, telecommunications, and travel) and cover 321 keywords. Our analysis 
confirms that the two percentage increases are indeed fairly close together (see Figure 4).  
 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
 
To further verify this finding, the intercept of the regression ( )1 1k kaδ β ξ− = + ⋅ −  
needs to be equal to zero and the coefficient for the percentage increase in clickthrough 
rates needs to be equal to one. By estimating a regression using our data with the intercept 
restricted to zero, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficient for the percentage 
increase in clickthrough rates is equal to one, thus providing further support for the 
assumption that a good guess for the optimal bid is indeed 50% times the profit 
contribution per conversion times the average conversion rate per keyword. Based on this 
empirical finding, proxy 2 equals: 
 2 50%.proxyk k kBid PC CR= ⋅ ⋅  (12) 
Drawback of Proxy 2 
The major drawback of proxy 2 is that it might be overly simplistic, with keywords 
differing only in their bid because of the profit contribution and the conversion rate that 
they generate. Thus, we compare all three approaches to calculate bids for keywords in 
newly set-up SEA campaigns (exact approach, proxy 1 and proxy 2) in a large-scale 
simulation study with the exact approach being the benchmark for the two proxy 
approaches. 
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Evaluation of Approach 
In order to evaluate the performance of the proxy approaches compared to the exact 
approach, we set up a large-scale simulation study, in which we vary the profit contribution 
per conversion as well as the conversion rate to calculate optimal and proxy bids. 
Simulating different levels of these metrics is necessary as they are not available in our 
data. The advantage of a simulation study is that it covers many different situations; the 
drawback is that not all scenarios are equally likely to occur in reality. 
Design of Study 
Table 4 details the design of the simulation study. For each pair of percentage increases in 
prices per click and clickthrough rates (N=321), we randomly draw 10 values from the 
uniform distributions for all six factor levels (3 x 2). For the profit contribution per 
conversion, we use three factor levels (high, medium, low) that are based on the article by 
Abou Nabout et al. (2012) and range between 10€ and 500€. For the conversion rate, we 
differentiate between two factor levels (high and low) that range between 0.05% and 5% 
and are also based on the simulation study conducted by Abou Nabout et al. (2012). In 
total, we simulate 19,260 different keyword scenarios to evaluate how close proxy bids are 
to the ones generated by the exact approach.  
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
Results 
In the previous section, we derived two possible categorizations (Ghose and Yang 2009 
and Broder 2002) that might be used to calculate proxy 1. In our evaluation of the different 
proxy approaches, we use both categorizations as well as proxy 2 to test which of the 
proxy approaches is best suited to calculate bids for keywords in newly set-up SEA 
campaigns. Table 5 shows the descriptive results for the bids calculated under the different 
approaches, as well as the difference between these bids. 
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
Surprisingly, the average bids are all very similar despite the very different 
approaches used to calculate them. The average bid under the exact approach is at 1.29€ 
with a minimum bid of 0.01€ and a maximum bid of 14.35€. Proxy 1, according to Ghose 
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and Yang (2009), generates an average bid of 1.30€ with a minimum bid of 0.02€ and a 
maximum bid of 13.07€. According to Border (2002), proxy 1 generates an average bid of 
1.30€ with a minimum bid of 0.02€ and a maximum bid of 14.22€. The range of bids under 
proxy 2 is somewhat smaller, with an average bid of 1.30€, a minimum bid of 0.03€ and a 
maximum bid of 11.98€. 
The largest difference between the exact bid and the proxy bid is generated by 
proxy 1 (Ghose and Yang 2009) with a deviation from -4.45€ to 2.99€. Surprisingly, the 
smallest difference between the exact bid and the proxy bid is generated by proxy 2 with 
deviations from -3.61€ to 2.85€. The deviations for proxy 1 (Broder 2002) range 
between -4.03€ and 2.94€.  
To better assess the difference in bids under the different proxy approaches 
compared to the benchmark (i.e., the exact approach), we calculate four different accuracy 
measures: mean absolute error, median absolute error, mean absolute percentage error, and 
median absolute percentage error. The reason for not only calculating the means of these 
accuracy measures, but also their medians, is that the means might be overly influenced by 
extreme situations. Table 6 reports the results for the different proxy approaches.  
 
Insert Table 6 about here 
 
Surprisingly, the mean absolute error and the median absolute percentage error of 
proxy 2 (0.0881€ and 0.0393%) are lower than both instances of proxy 1, which have 
slightly higher errors (Ghose and Yang 2009: 0.1004€ and 0.0479%; Broder 2002: 0.0972€ 
and 0.0403%).  However, the differences between all proxies are rather small. The mean 
(median) absolute error is never larger than 10 (2) cents and the mean (median) absolute 
percentage error is always below 12% (5%). 
According to the median absolute error and the mean absolute percentage error, the 
Broder (2002) version of proxy 1 performs best. As a consequence, advertisers are advised 
to use proxy 1 according to Broder (2002), but not proxy 1 according to Ghose and Yang 
(2009). However, because proxy 2 also performs very well and is much easier to 
implement without requiring keyword classification (which is time-consuming and 
cumbersome), we suggest that advertisers use proxy 2 if they cannot afford to collect the 
required Google Keyword Planner data to implement the exact approach. 
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Summary, Conclusions, and Managerial Implications 
SEA is today’s most popular online advertising instrument, as evidenced by the steady 
increase in SEA expenditures in recent years. Previous research has created solutions for 
optimal bidding in SEA, but these require that advertisers obtain good estimates of several 
metrics (average profit contribution per conversion, average conversion rate per keyword, 
percentage increase in prices per click, and percentage increase in clickthrough rates) to 
calculate these optimal bids. The percentage increase in prices per click thereby reflects 
how strongly prices per click increase within better ranks and the percentage increase in 
clickthrough rates captures how strongly clickthrough rates (= number of clicks / number 
of searches) increase within better ranks. 
Unfortunately, advertisers who set up SEA campaigns for the first time need to 
place bids on keywords, but typically lack good estimates of the above metrics. It is 
particularly challenging to find good estimates for the percentage increases in prices per 
click and clickthrough rates, as advertisers need to know how prices per click and 
clickthrough rates change across different ranks. As a consequence, it is fairly hard to 
predict which rank maximizes the keyword’s profit after acquisition costs. 
This article reports on a novel approach for solving the problem of bidding on 
keywords in newly set-up SEA campaigns. Our approach overcomes two common 
problems in SEA—limited variation in bids and endogeneity of bids—by using macro-
level data from Google’s Keyword Planner tool rather than individual advertiser data. In 
typical SEA campaigns, advertisers change their bids infrequently, such that it might be 
difficult to identify the percentage increases from advertisers’ individual keyword data. In 
addition, potential endogeneity of bids might be a problem because bids for a particular 
keyword might be correlated with random shocks (e.g., a sunny weekend).  
Our exact approach, however, requires advertisers to manually collect additional 
data from the Google Keyword Planner or to develop software in order to retrieve the 
corresponding data from Google’s developer service. Both solutions are costly and time-
consuming. Thus, we additionally present two proxy approaches that are aimed at 
supporting advertisers in making good bidding decisions even in cases in which they 
cannot afford to collect the required data. 
Proxy 1 is thereby based on “typical” percentage increases for different types of 
keywords across different industries. It allows the advertiser to not only take differences in 
the profit contribution per conversion as well as the conversion rate into account, but also 
to consider differences in the percentage increases across different types of keywords. The 
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drawback of such an approach is that the coefficients established in this article to predict 
the percentage increases in prices per click and clickthrough rates might be subject to 
changes over time. In addition, we only cover nine different industries. “Typical” 
percentage increases in other industries might thus be very different from the ones found in 
this empirical study. 
Thus, we also present proxy 2, which uses the empirical finding that both 
percentage increases are often very close together and assumes that the ratio of the 
percentage increases is equal to 50% (Skiera and Abou Nabout 2013). The beauty of proxy 
2 lies in its simplicity: The advertiser only needs to know the average profit contribution 
per conversion for a keyword as well as its average conversion rate. However, its 
simplicity might also be its major drawback.  
To understand how well the proxy approaches perform in contrast to the exact 
approach, we used a large-scale data set covering nine different industries as well as 
different keyword types (Ghose and Yang 2009: branded/retailer/generic; Broder 2002: 
informational/navigational/transactional) of varying competition levels. Through this 
method, we benchmark the two proxy approaches against the exact approach in a 
simulation study. The surprising result is that all approaches seem to perform reasonably 
well and that the easiest approach to implement (proxy 2) even performs best in terms of 
the mean absolute error and the median absolute percentage error. 
Based on the results of the simulation study, advertisers are advised to use proxy 1 
where feasible, categorizing keywords according to Broder (2002) rather than Ghose and 
Yang (2009). But because proxy 2 is much easier to implement without requiring keyword 
classification (which is time-consuming and cumbersome), and even performs best in 
terms of the mean absolute error and the median absolute percentage error, we suggest that 
advertisers use proxy 2 if they cannot afford to collect the required Google Keyword 
Planner data to implement the exact approach. 
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Figures 
Figure 1 
Overview of Bidding Approaches 
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Figure 2 
Google Keyword Planner Interface 
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Figure 3 
Number of Keywords per Industry 
 
 
  
26 
Figure 4 
Comparison of Percentage Increases in Prices per Click and Clickthrough Rates 
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Tables 
Table 1 
Illustration of Percentage Increases in Prices per Click and Clickthrough Rates 
 Prices per click (in €) 
Percentage increase in prices per click: 20% 
Clickthrough rates (in %) 
Percentage increase in clickthrough rates: 40% 
Rank 1 2.07 3.84 
Rank 2 1.73 2.74 
Rank 3 1.44 1.96 
Rank 4 1.20 1.40 
Rank 5 1.00 1.00 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics by Keyword Type  
 Ghose & Yang (2009) Broder (2002) 
Average values per keyword 
(N=321) Generic Branded Retailer Informational Transactional Navigational 
Number of keywords 213 85 23 106 122 93 
Number of observations 4,658 1,775 534 2121 2,792 2,054 
Number of global searches 1,268,959 8,681,148 1,127,515 2,149,635 1,029,055 7,054,256 
Number of local searches 598,740 889,871 194,844 1,099,118 206,141 762,281 
Degree of competition  0.79 0.35 0.56 0.71 0.86 0.34 
Price per click 
(in €)  
Rank 1-3 1.66 1.14 1.19 1.70 1.57 1.16 
Rank 4-6 1.49 0.79 0.56 1.23 1.67 0.68 
Number of clicks Rank 1-3 670.00 355.00 304.00 1,085.96 298.79 358.74 
Rank 4-6 161.00 58.00 4.00 261.95 76.06 51.77 
Search engine advertising costs 
(in €)  
Rank 1-3 9,427.37 2,725.09 1,493.84 18,467.61 1,454.55 2695.22 
Rank 4-6 1,030.18 15.93 4.31 1,185.43 868.56 9.30 
Percentage increase in prices per click (in %) 43 175 158 40 52 183 
Percentage increase in clickthrough rates (in %) 52 129 86 54 50 130 
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Table 3 
Determinants of the Logarithms of the Multiplier Reflecting the Increase in Prices per 
Click and Clickthrough Rates for Different Types of Keywords 
 (1) Ghose & Yang (2009) (2) Broder (2002) 
 ln(δk)  ln(ξk) ln(δk) ln(ξk) 
Intercept 
0.67 
(0.08) 
***  0.88 
(0.07) 
*** 1.08 
(0.07) 
*** 0.99 
(0.06) 
*** 
Branded 0.36 
(0.04) 
***  0.06 
(0.04) 
n.s. .  .  
Retailer 0.37 
(0.06) 
***  0.04 
(0.05) 
n.s. .  .  
Informational .   .  -0.43 
(0.04) 
*** -0.12 
(0.04) 
*** 
Transactional .   .  -0.31 
(0.05) 
*** 0.03 
(0.05) 
n.s. 
Airlines 0.09 
(0.07) 
n.s.  -0.12 
(0.06) 
** 0.05 
(0.06) 
n.s. -0.16 
(0.06) 
*** 
Automotive 0.06 
(0.06) 
n.s.  0.07 
(0.05) 
n.s. 0.06 
(0.06) 
n.s. 0.05 
(0.05) 
n.s. 
Banking 0.07 
(0.07) 
n.s.  0.01 
(0.06) 
n.s. 0.06 
(0.07) 
n.s. -0.00 
(0.06) 
n.s. 
Online banking 0.03 
(0.06) 
n.s.  -0.12 
(0.05) 
** -0.02 
(0.06) 
n.s. -0.15 
(0.05) 
*** 
Drug stores 0.03 
(0.07) 
n.s.  -0.01 
(0.06) 
n.s. 0.04 
(0.07) 
n.s. -0.01 
(0.06) 
n.s. 
Energy -0.01 
(0.06) 
n.s.  -0.05 
(0.06) 
n.s. -0.03 
(0.06) 
n.s. -0.06 
(0.06) 
n.s. 
Telecommunications 0.03 
(0.6) 
n.s.  -0.07 
(0.05) 
n.s. 0.05 
(0.06) 
n.s. -0.09 
(0.06) 
n.s. 
Travel 0.08 
(0.06) 
n.s.  -0.10 
(0.05) 
** 0.06 
(0.06) 
n.s. -0.12 
(0.05) 
** 
Degree of 
competition 
-0.60 
(0.07) 
***  -0.64 
(0.06) 
*** -0.60 
(0.07) 
*** -0.62 
(0.06) 
*** 
Number of words 0.02 
(0.03) 
n.s.  0.04 
(0.03) 
n.s. 0.01 
(0.03) 
n.s. 0.01 
(0.03) 
n.s. 
Number of characters 0.00 
(0.00) 
n.s.  -0.00 
(0.00) 
n.s. 0.00 
(0.00) 
n.s. -0.00 
(0.00) 
n.s. 
Number of searches 0.00 
(0.00) 
n.s.  0.00 
(0.00) 
n.s. 0.00 
(0.00) 
n.s. 0.00 
(0.00) 
* 
German  0.06 
(0.03) 
*  0.00 
(0.03) 
n.s. 0.07 
(0.03) 
** 0.00 
(0.03) 
n.s. 
R2 0.62   0.57  0.64  0.59  
F-value 33.73 ***  26.96 *** 36.29 *** 28.84 *** 
Number of 
observations 
321   321  321  321  
Note: Base keyword type is generic for (1) and navigational for (2). Base industry is the insurance 
industry for both categorizations. Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
*** p< 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1, n.s. p > 0.1. 
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Table 4 
Simulation Study Design 
Factors Number of factor levels Value for factor levels 
Profit contribution per customer  3 • High:   PCk = [251€;500€] 
• Medium:  PCk = [51€;250€] 
• Low: PCk = [10€;50€] 
Conversion rate 2 • High: CRk = [.026;.05] 
• Low: CRk = [.005;.025] 
Percentage increase in prices per 
click Available through data 
(N = 321 keywords) Percentage increase in 
clickthrough rates 
Number of keywords in one replication 321 x 3 x 2 = 1,926 
Number of replications 10 
Total number of keywords 19,260 
Note: The factor levels are based on Abou Nabout et al. (2012). 
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Table 5 
Different Bids according to Exact Approach, Proxy 1, and Proxy 2 
N=19,260 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Median Min Max 
Exact bid in € 1.29 1.23 1.05 0.01 14.35 
Proxy 1 in € (Ghose & Yang 2009) 1.30 1.27 1.04 0.02 13.07 
Proxy 1 in € (Broder 2002) 1.30 1.26 1.04 0.02 14.22 
Proxy 2 in € 1.30 1.24 1.04 0.03 11.98 
Difference proxy 1 (Ghose & Yang 2009) and 
exact bid in €   
0.01 0.27 -0.01 -4.45 2.99 
Difference proxy 1 (Broder 2002) and exact bid 
in €   
0.01 0.27 -0.01 -4.03 2.94 
Difference proxy 2 and exact bid in €   0.01 0.22 -0.01 -3.61 2.85 
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Table 6 
Simulation Study Results 
N=19,260 Proxy 1 
(Ghose & Yang 2009) 
Proxy 1 
(Broder 2002) 
Proxy 2 
Mean absolute error in € 0.1004 0.0972 0.0881 
Median absolute error in € 0.0181 0.0162 0.0170 
Mean absolute percentage error in % 0.1092 0.1062 0.1120 
Median absolute percentage error in % 0.0479 0.0403 0.0393 
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Appendix A 
Table A1 
Correlation Table of All Variables 
 
 ξk-1 δk-1 branded retailer generic airlines automotive banking 
online 
banking 
drug 
stores energy 
telecomm 
-unications travel insurances competition 
word 
count 
character 
count searches german 
naviga-
tional 
informa-
tional 
transac-
tional 
ξk-1 1.00                      
δk-1 0.00 1.00                     
branded 0.07 -0.04 1.00                    
retailer -0.02 0.17 -0.21 1.00                   
generic -0.05 -0.06 -0.79 -0.31 1.00                  
airlines -0.02 -0.02 -0.09 0.15 0.02 1.00                 
automotive 0.02 -0.02 0.12 -0.09 -0.04 -0.13 1.00                
banking 0.03 -0.02 -0.09 0.02 0.04 -0.10 -0.12 1.00               
online 
banking -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.10 0.09 -0.12 -0.14 -0.10 1.00              
drug stores -0.02 0.18 -0.14 0.28 0.01 -0.09 -0.11 -0.08 -0.10 1.00             
energy -0.03 0.00 -0.05 -0.10 0.06 -0.12 -0.14 -0.10 -0.12 -0.10 1.00            
telecomm-
unications -0.03 -0.02 0.16 -0.06 -0.10 -0.13 -0.16 -0.12 -0.14 -0.11 -0.14 1.00           
travel -0.03 -0.02 -0.08 0.07 0.05 -0.13 -0.16 -0.12 -0.14 -0.11 -0.14 -0.16 1.00          
insurances 0.11 -0.02 0.13 -0.11 -0.11 -0.13 -0.15 -0.11 -0.13 -0.10 -0.13 -0.15 -0.15 1.00         
competition -0.11 -0.06 -0.66 -0.09 0.68 0.15 -0.04 0.05 0.01 -0.11 -0.05 -0.08 0.16 -0.10 1.00        
word count -0.05 0.03 -0.16 -0.16 0.29 0.11 -0.11 0.02 0.07 0.02 -0.13 0.06 0.06 -0.10 0.44 1.00       
character 
count -0.05 0.04 -0.44 -0.03 0.42 0.03 -0.17 0.08 0.08 0.00 -0.10 -0.10 0.08 0.12 0.57 0.64 1.00      
searches 0.30 -0.01 0.11 -0.08 -0.03 0.00 0.13 0.01 -0.12 -0.06 -0.03 0.06 0.04 -0.05 -0.20 -0.22 -0.28 1.00     
german -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.02 0.02 -0.12 -0.13 0.11 0.08 -0.07 0.08 0.04 -0.03 0.05 0.17 0.00 0.10 -0.13 1.00    
naviga-
tional 0.09 0.07 0.68 0.34 -0.91 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 -0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.12 -0.73 -0.39 -0.47 0.07 -0.03 1.00   
informa-
tional -0.05 -0.04 -0.44 -0.18 0.56 -0.15 0.00 0.04 -0.03 0.07 0.10 -0.09 0.05 0.03 0.21 -0.28 -0.04 0.09 0.01 -0.52 1.00  
transact-
tional -0.05 -0.04 -0.30 -0.19 0.44 0.15 -0.02 0.00 0.09 -0.06 -0.05 0.07 -0.01 -0.16 0.57 0.69 0.55 -0.17 0.02 -0.57 -0.40 1.00 
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Appendix B 
Figure B1 
Histograms of the Residuals for Regressions (8)-(11) 
 Ghose & Yang (2009) Broder (2002) 
Percentage increase 
in prices per click 
  
Percentage increase 
in clickthrough 
rates 
  
Note: The above histograms show the distribution of the residuals for each of the four regressions (8)-(11). The residuals are approximately normally distributed and thus well-
behaved. 
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